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Comments
The Uniform Residential Landlord And
Tenant Act: Effect Of Adoption On
California Law
In response to the current criticism of the inequity and ineffi-
ciency characteristic of landlord-tenant law, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed, and
the California Legislature is presently considering, a Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act. This comment examines by
means of comparison with existing California law the effect which
adoption of this Act would have on landlord-tenant relations in
California. The author concludes that the Uniform Act, if
adopted, would not make any significant substantive changes in
California landlord-tenant law; rather it would promote clarity and
understanding of the law with the result being a reduction in the
frequency of litigation.
The purpose of this comment is to introduce the significant provi-
sions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act to the Cal-
ifornia legal community and to compare these provisions with existing
California law.
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Act") is a proposal prepared by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for adoption by the states. The
Act had its origin in a research project (1968-69) of the American
Bar Foundation, directed by Professor Julian H. Levi of the University
of Chicago School of Law, which resulted in a tentative draft of a
Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code.1 In 1970 a National Con-
ference subcommittee with Professor Levi as reporter-draftsman con-
tinued research which included circulation of four successive drafts of
the Act for comments by representatives of various interest groups.
Final approval of the Act for submission to the states was made at the
1. 1. LEvi, MODEL REsIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (Tent. Draft 1969).
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annual meeting of the National Conference on August 10, 1972.2
With the California Legislature actively considering this Act,3 the
scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of the effect which
adoption of the Act would have on existing landlord-tenant law in
California. The Act will be considered in its final draft as proposed
by the National Conference, as opposed to modified versions contained
in bills introduced in the legislature, which perhaps represent only in-
terim positions in search of a final compromise. Because the Act by
its terms is limited to residential rental situations, only California law
which is directly applicable to rental agreements for dwelling units will
be compared.4
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Article I contains material concerning the Act's application and sub-
ject matter,5 scope and jurisdiction, 6 general definitions,? and general
provisions.' The discussion of this article will be limited to those
provisions which appear significant either because of the delineation
of the scope of the Act or because of the effect of the change on exist-
ing California law.
A. Purpose of the Act
Section 1.102(b): Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(I) to simplify, clarify, modernize, and revise the law governing
the rental of dwelling units and the rights and obligations of land-
lords and tenants;
(2) to encourage landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the
quality of housing; and
2. Julian H. Levi, testimony at Hearings on Landlord-Tenant Law Before the
California Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, Oct. 12-13, 1972, at 5 [herein-
after cited as Landlord-Tenant Hearings]. Copies of the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act [hereinafter cited as URLTA] are available from the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 North Michigan Ave., Chicago,
Illinois 60611.
3. The Act was the subject of two days of hearings, Oct. 12-13, 1972, in Los
Angeles, California, before the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary. Landlord-
Tenant Hearings, supra note 2. A.B. 1202, 1973-74 Regular Session, is substantially
the URLTA with slight variations considered desirable for California. A.B. 1203,
1973-74 Regular Session, is a companion bill containing a modified unlawful detainer
procedure which would be utilized in conjunction with the substantive rights con-
tained in A.B. 1202.
4. Mhe uniform act would, if enacted as part of the law of [California],
require that only those existing statutes relating to the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship where the property is let for dwelling purposes be amended or re-
pealed. Landlord-tenant statutes of general application to all leases or rental
agreements would govern only in situations where the uniform act is silent.
Letter from Legislative Counsel of California, George H. Murphy, to Assemblyman
Charles Warren, Aug. 31, 1972.
5. URLTA art. I, pt. I.
6. URLTA art. I, pt. II.
7. URLTA art. L pt. M.
8. URLTA art. I, pt. IV.
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(3) to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act
among those states which enact it.
Subsections (1) and (2) reflect the various reasons advanced by the
commentators for a revision of the landlord-tenant law. These reasons
have been the subject of much discussion in law review articles and
commentsI and further discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
The purpose expressed in subsection (3) has two primary benefits
as expounded by Professor Levi.10 First, in many metropolitan areas
the housing market extends across state lines, and thus uniformity of
laws among these states is desirable.-' Secondly, uniformity of laws
among states "as a result of considered, thoughtful state legislative ac-
tion"'12 is as effective a means as is available to prevent usurpation of
state governing power by the enactment of federal legislation to rectify
what could be considered a national problem in the residential housing
market. The uniformity of state action removes that aspect of the fed-
eral solution which is its very real attraction.' 3 The threat of federal
action is substantial in view of the fact that the Department of Housing
and Urban Development already requires local public housing agen-
cies to use a form lease for low-rent housing projects. This lease spec-
ifies certain minimum rights and obligations of the parties and es-
tablishes grievance procedures.' 4 In addition, the Federal Housing
Administration mortgage insurance is a significant source of national
financing with which further restrictions on local landlord-tenant law
could be accomplished.' 5
B. Scope of the Act
The Act "applies to, regulates, and determines rights, obligations
and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwell-
9. See generally, Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of
Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HAsT. L.J. 369
(1970); Johnson, Collective Tenant Action: Should the Rent Strike be Institutionalized?,
46 L.A. BAR BULL. 138 (1971); Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REv.
61 (1969); Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21
HAsT. L.J. 287 (1970); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: A Proposal for
Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966); Shacter, Warranty of Habitability: A New View,
16 LONG BEACH BAR BuLL. No. 11, at 9 (1970); Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Re-
pairing the Duty to Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 298 (1971).
10. Julian H. Levi, testimony at Landlord-Tenant Hearings at 6.
11. This, of course, is not applicable to California.
12. Julian H. Levi, statement in Landlord-Tenant Hearings app. G, at G4.
13. John M. McCabe, Legislative Director, Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform
State Laws, statement in Landlord-Tenant Hearings app. F, at F2.
14. Housing Authority of the City of Omaha, Neb. v. U.S. Housing Authority,
468 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1972), upheld HUD's power to require use of these standard
form leases by local public housing authorities. "HUD does have the ultimate super-
vision and authority in carrying out the objectives of the Housing Act." 468 F.2d at 7.
See Hirshen, HUD Lease and Grievance Circulars Upheld, 6 CLEARiNOHOUSE RYsV.
415 (1972).
15. Julian H. Levi, testimony at Landlord-Tenant Hearings at 6.
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ing unit located within [the] state.""' However, certain occupancy
arrangements, such as residence in an institution, residence in a social
organization's premises, and transient hotel residency, among others,
are specifically excluded from the application of the Act.' 7  These
exclusions are based upon the premise that the Act "is not intended
to apply where residence is incidental to another primary purpose
.... ,"18 California law already recognizes that most of the excluded
arrangements are not governed by landlord-tenant law.19 As to these
occupancy situations, the Act would merely serve to clarify what are
often implicit exclusions from the scope of the law applicable to leases.
Also excluded from coverage under the Act are premises leased pri-
marily for agricultural purposes; this appears to be a logical exclusion
from an Act designed to provide special laws for residential tenancies.
C. Unconscionable Terms
The Act provides that if a court finds that a provision of an agree-
ment was unconscionable when made, "the court may refuse to enforce
the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the
unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscion-
16. URLTA §1.201.
17. URLTA §1.202: Unless created to avoid application of this Act, the
following arrangements are not governed by this Act:
(1) Residence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention
or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational, counseling, religious, or
similar service.
(2) Occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property
of which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who suc-
ceeds to his interest.
(3) Occupancy by a member of a fraternal or social organization in the
portion of a structure operated for the benefit of the organization.
(4) Transient occupancy in a hotel, or motel, or lodging subject to cite state
transient lodgings or room occupancy excise tax act.
(5) Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupancy is
conditional upon employment in and about the premises.
(6) Occupancy by an owner of a condominium unit or a holder of a propri-
etary lease in a cooperative.
(7) Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the
occupant primarily for agricultural purposes.
18. URLTA §1.202, Comment. In considering the weight to be given the Offi-
cial Comments of the URLTA, one must be reminded that the California Legislature did
not include the Official Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code when it enacted
that code into law, and it is possible that the Comments of the URLTA will likewise not
be given the effect of law. However, URLTA §1.102(a) provides, "This Act shall
be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."
Therefore, it appears that the Comments, though perhaps lacking the effect of law,
will be significant sources for an understanding of the objectives and purposes of the
URLTA. Cf. WsT's ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL CODE vol. 23A, at v
(1964) (with reference to the Official Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code).
19. 2 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CuRRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §542
(condominium ownership), §§550-51 (holder of proprietary lease in cooperative)
(1971) [hereinafter cited as MILLER & STARR]; 3 MILLER & STARR §964 (vendee
in possession), §965 (licensee, as of educational or fraternal organization), §966
(lodger, as transient occupant of hotel), §968 (residence by employee conditioned
upon employment).
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able provision to avoid an unconscionable result. '20  For purposes of
this section, agreement includes both the original rental agreement and
any settlement in which a party agrees to waive any right provided by
the Act or rental agreement. Though the term unconscionable is not
defined in the Act, the comment to the section states that the test of
unconscionability is "whether, in light of the background and setting of
the market, [and] the conditions of the particular parties to the rental
agreement, [the agreement or provision is] so one-sided as to be un-
conscionable .. ".. 21 "If unconscionability is put into issue by a
party or by the court upon its own motion, the parties shall be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose,
and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in mak-
ing the determination. '12 2  Such a determination by the court is a con-
clusion of law.28 The purpose of this section of the Act is "to make
it possible for the courts to police explicitly against rental agreements,
clauses, settlements, or waivers of claim or right which they find to be
unconscionable.
'24
Traditionally, as an extension of the principle that "equity should
not lend its aid to the enforcement of a 'hard bargain,' "2 California
courts have refused to grant specific performance of unconscionable
contracts26 and have often allowed rescission of them.27  While uncon-
scionability is not recognized as a defense to an action at law in Califor-
nia,2 8 courts have afforded relief indirectly through various techniques,
such as, interpreting potentially unconscionable provisions in the fine
20. URLTA §1.303. This section was adopted from UNIFom COMMERCIAL
CODE §2-302. ULTRA §1.303, Comment
21. URLTA §1.303, Comment.
22. URLTA §1.303(b).
23. URLTA §1.303(a); URLTA §1.303, Comment.
24. URLTA §1.303, Comment.
25. 4 B. WrruN, SuimnR oF CALIFoRNIA LAW, Equity §29 (7th ed. 1960).
26. Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 422 P.2d 329, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1967)
(specific performance denied based on application of CAL. Civ. CODE §3391 which
provides that specific performance cannot be enforced against a party if the contract
"is not, as to him, just and reasonable"); Jacklich v. Baer, 57 Cal. App. 2d 684, 693,
135 P.2d 179, 184 (1943) ("Specific performance will always be refused when a
contract itself is unfair, one-sided, unconscionable, or affected by any other such in-
equitable feature, and when specific enforcement would be oppressive upon the de-
fendant, or would prevent the enjoyment of his own rights, or would in any other
manner work injustice").
27. Blattman v. Gadd, 112 Cal. App. 76, 97, 296 P. 681, 689 (1931)(rescission
of contract granted where contract was "unreasonable and unconscionable, and there-
fore void").
28. Consider Brandolino v. Lindsay, 269 Cal. App. 2d 319, 75 Cal. Rptr. 56
(1969), wherein the plaintiff-buyer requested specific performance of a contract for
the sale of land and, in the alternative, damages for defendant's refusal to convey.
The purchase price in the contract was $50,000 and at trial it was established that the
fair market value of the property was $75,000. In affirming the trial court, the court
held that as the consideration for the purchase of the property was inadequate spe-
cific performance was properly denied but the damages of $25,000 for breach of the
contract were proper. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 326, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
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print of lengthy, standardized contracts against the party using them29 or
finding that the unconscionability amounts to fraud for which the con-
tract may be voided.80 California did not adopt the unconscionability
section of the Uniform Commercial Code,3 1 but in those states which
did it appears that the section has been used successfully as a defense
to legal actions. 32  Judging from the experience of other states with
the Uniform Commercial Code provision, it appears that the Act
would provide California courts greater flexibility in reforming con-
tracts to remove unconscionable terms. Practically, the section would
tend to make the parties more cognizant of the prohibition on uncon-




A section of the Act, complementary to the unconscionability sec-
tion, prohibits the inclusion of certain provisions in rental agreements.
Any provision whereby the tenant waives his rights under the Act, au-
thorizes another to confess judgment, agrees to pay the landlord's at-
torney fees, or consents to an exculpatory or indemnity clause in favor
of the landlord is prohibited 4 and unenforceable. 35 As to the first
prohibited provision, California law already treats waiver of certain of
29. 1 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs §128 (1963).
30. State Finance Co. v. Smith, 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 691, 112 P.2d 901, 903
(1941) ("Although inadequacy of consideration alone is no defense to the enforce-
ment of a contract voluntarily made, . . . [w]here the inadequacy is so gross as to
shock the conscience and common sense of all men, it may amount both at law and in
equity to proof of fraud, oppression and undue influence").
31. "Mhe decision to delete this section from [the California Commercial
Code] was based upon the belief that giving courts unqualified power to strike down
terms they might consider 'unconscionable' could result in the renegotiation of con-
tracts in every case of disagreement with the fairness of provisions the parties had
accepted." The California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uni-
form Commercial Code: A Special Report, 37 CAL. S.B.J. 119, 136 (1962).
32. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct.
1969)(selling for $900 a freezer unit having an actual retail value of $300 was,
under the Uniform Commercial Code, unconscionable as a matter of law; the court
reduced the payment provision of the contract to the amount already paid, i.e., $600).
33. Professor Levi suggests an additional advantage relating to the burden of
successfully establishing the defense of unconscionability. In states where the equita-
ble defense of unconscionability is recognized as originating from case law, the suc-
cess in proving unconscionability is often directly related to the wealth of the party
and his access to thorough legal assistance. With the addition of this section, par-
ticularly subsection (b), Professor Levi expects that either party will have a greater
opportunity for successful presentation to the court without the elaborate degree of
proof. Landlord-Tenant Hearings at 12.
34. URLTA §1.403(a): A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under this Act;
(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of
the rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord
arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or the costs
connected therewith.
35. URLTA §1.403(b).
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the tenant's statutory rights as void as against public policy80 and
hence unenforceable. As to the three other prohibited provisions of
this section, the Act would effect changes in California law. A tenant
is presently not prevented from confessing judgment on a claim arising
out of a rental agreement. 37 An agreement by the tenant to pay the
landlord's reasonable attorney fees may now be given effect by any
court in which the landlord is successful in his action relating to that
agreement.38 A landlord may now escape liability for injuries to oth-
ers resulting from his passive negligence, i.e., nonfeasance, by an ex-
culpatory clause in the rental agreement as to the tenant " and by an
indemnity clause by the tenant as to third persons. 40 However, it ap-
pears a landlord may not escape liability for his affirmative negli-
gence,41 i.e., misfeasance, and definitely not for his intentional wrong-
doing.
42
More significant than the fact that certain provisions in a rental
agreement are unenforceable under the Act is the penalty for the use of
these provisions. "If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement
containing provisions known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may
recover in addition to his actual damages an amount up to three months'
periodic rent . . . ."' California law apparently has no such pen-
alty for the inclusion of unenforceable terms. The purpose of this sub-
section of the Act is to prevent the landlord from using judicially un-
enforceable provisions to acquire a superior bargaining position with
the tenant in out-of-court settlements.44
36. For example, CAL. Civ. CODE §1942.1 (waiver of tenant's rights under
§§1941-42), §1942.5 (waiver of tenant's retaliatory eviction protection), §1945.5
(waiver of tenant's protection against automatic renewal of tenancy).
37. CAL. Cirv. CODE §§1132-35.
38. Stockton Theaters, Inc. v. Palermo, 124 Cal. App. 2d 353, 357, 268 P.2d 799,
802 (1954); see M. MosKovrrz, P. HONIGSBERG & D. FINKELSTEIN, CALIFORNIA EVICTION
DEFENSE MANUAL §15.20 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MosKovrTz ET AL.]. Under CAL.
CIV. CODE §1717, when a contract provides for attorney fees to be awarded to one
party, the other party will also be entitled to such fees should he prevail in the action.
The Act specifically provides that in conjunction with certain of the remedies under
the Act the aggrieved party may recover reasonable attorney fees. Usually, allowance
for attorney fees is provided when the wrongful conduct is either willful or not in
good faith. The implication is that where not provided by the Act, recovery of
attorney fees is not available to the successful party unless there is a provision to the
contrary in the rental agreement. As the tenant is prevented from doing so by
URLTA §1.403(a) (3), only the landlord can make an effective agreement to pay the
adverse party's attorney fees. However, it would appear that the reciprocity of re-
covery of attorney fees provided by CAL. CIv. CODE §1717 would make the tenant
liable for the attorney fees of the successful landlord in the instances when the land-
lord has agreed to pay attorney fees if the tenant were successful.
39. Werner v. Knoll, 89 Cal. App. 2d 474, 476, 201 P.2d 45, 47 (1948).
40. Inglis v. Garland, 19 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 64 P.2d 501 (1936).
41. Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953); Butt v.
Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 138, 242 P.2d 32, 39 (1952).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE §1668. See J. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA LANDLORD AND TENANT
LAW AND PROCEDURE 189-91 (4th ed. 1966).
43. URLTA §1.403(b).
44. URLTA §1.403, Comment.
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E. Determination of Terms of the Rental Agreement
By providing for the determination of terms of the rental agreement
in the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the Act
would continue the departure of California law from the rigid common
law rule that an agreement must be reasonably definite and certain as
to its terms in order to be enforceable. The Act would, however,
make changes in certain California presumptions. First, in the absence
of an agreement, California law presumes that the term of the tenancy
is a period equal to the interval specified for the determination of
rent.4 5 Under the Act the term would be a monthly period in all
cases, except in the case of a "roomer who pays weekly rent" in which
instance the term would be one week.46 Secondly, rent would be
payable at the beginning of the term,47 as opposed to the California
rule of payment at the end of the term.48 Thirdly, rent would be uni-
formly apportioned on a daily basis regardless of when paid,49 whereas
California law presently allows apportionment of rent due for a period
prematurely terminated,50 but not if the rent is prepaid (at least
where the termination is not the landlord's fault).51
Under the Act "in the absence of agreement, the tenant shall pay as
rent the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling
unit."52  California law provides that a tenant in possession without
an agreement as to the amount of the rent is liable for the fair rental
value of the premises. 53  This liability for rent, expressed in the Cali-
fornia cases, arises because the tenant's possession of the premises es-
tablishes privity of estate and does not arise because of any contractual
privity within the rental agreement.54 The rent determination provi-
sion of the Act makes no reference to a requirement that the tenant be
in possession and furthermore the provision is part of the presumed
contractual terms of the rental agreement. Therefore, in the absence
of an agreement as to rent, the Act apparently would broaden the
California law to the extent that a tenant would be liable for a fair
rental value under privity of contract 55 as well as under privity of es-
tate.
45. CAL. Crv. CoDa §1944.
46. URLTA §1.401(d).
47. URLTA §1.401(c).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE §1947.
49. URLTA §1.401(c).
50. CAL. CiV. CODE §1935.
51. Friedman v. Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952); see 3
MILLER & STAER §1006.
52. URLTA § 1.401(b).
53. Ellingson v. Walsh, O'Conner & Barneson, 15 Cal. 2d 673, 104 P.2d 507
(1940); Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 146 P. 638 (1915); Schmitt v. Felix,
157 Cal. App. 2d 642, 321 P.2d 473 (1958).
54. 3 MILLER& STARR §1002.
55. Compare with UNIFoRM CoMMERcIAL CODE §2-305 (CAL. COMm. CODE
795
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F. Termination Notice Period
Under the Act, either party may terminate a week-to-week tenancy
without cause 10 days following a written notice to this effect."'
Either party "may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written
notice given to the other at least 60 days before the periodic rental date
specified in this notice. '5 7  Conceivably, in the month-to-month ten-
ancy a party could be obligated to continue the rental agreement for
as long as 90 days after notice because of the notice period's relation
to the rental renewal date. This is a substantial change from Califor-
nia law which requires only a 30-day notice period when rent is pay-
able monthly without regard to the periodic rental renewal date.08  In
all other periodic tenancies in California, notice must be given "at
least as long before the expiration [of the term] as the term of the
hiring itself, not exceeding 30 days." 59
OBLIGATIONS
It appears that the Act would not cause a substantial change in the
obligations of the parties which exist under California law today. It
would primarily make these existing obligations more explicit and defi-
nite. This discussion of those articles6 of the Act enumerating the
parties' obligations is limited to a comparison with their current obli-
gations under California law. All comparisons of the remedies avail-
able upon the noncompliance with these duties is made in the next part
of this comment.
LANDLORD'S OBLIGATIONS
A. Maintenance and Service
The substance of the landlord's duty to maintain a habitable dwell-
ing unit under the Act is basically the same as under existing Cali-
fornia law, though it appears the obligations are more precisely ex-
pressed. The most significant maintenance obligation which is re-
quired of the California landlord was that first recognized in Hinson v.
Dells.61 That case holds that with the leasing of a dwelling unit there
§2305) as indicative of another current code provision providing for the determination




58. CAL. CIV. CODE §1946.
59. Id.
60. URLTA arts. I & III.
61. 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1st dist., June 1972). The implied
warranty of habitability has since been adopted by another California district court of
appeal. Ball v. Tobeler, 2 Civ. No. 38424 (Cal. App., 2d dist., Sept. 1972). The
California Supreme Court has not considered the issue of the existence of the implied
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exists a covenant implied in the rental agreement by operation of law
(implied warranty of habitability) that the landlord will maintain the
premises in a habitable condition. The measure of the duty imposed
is substantial compliance 62 with the building and housing codes, both
state and municipal. 3  In attempting to delineate this affirmative
duty, the court states, "Minor housing code violations standing alone
which do not affect habitability must be considered de minimis. ..;
and likewise, the violation must be relevant and affect the tenant's
apartment or the common areas which he uses." '64 In limiting the
"substantial code compliance' required by this duty to only that
which is "relevant and affects the tenant's dwelling unit," the court
provides little precision for the determination of the scope of the
duty under the implied warranty of habitability. In view of the rela-
tive scarcity of appellate cases dealing with residential tenancy situa-
tions, it does not appear likely that more definite standards will be
established by the judiciary in the immediate future.65
warranty of habitability within residential leases, but is currently considering three
cases containing this issue: Murdock v. Lofton, 31 Cal. App. 3d 981, 107 Cal. Rptr.
551 (1973), hg. granted, June 30, 1973 (S.F. 23024); Green v. Superior Court, Ct.
of App. 1 Civ. No. 32598; Sup. Ct. No. S.F. 22993 (1973); Hall v. Municipal Court,
Ct. of App. 1 Civ. No. 32597; Sup. CL No. S.F. 22992 (1973).
62. While it seems impossible to set out any exact standards for determining
when a breach is "substantial," and the courts have not tried to do so, (sub-
stantial] seems to be a roughly workable test which can be adapted to the
many varied situations likely to come up. In any event, it appears to be the
test which the courts will follow. Case law will help to define the stan-
dards, although it would seem that most decisions on this issue will continue
to be made on a somewhat visceral basis.
Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and The Implied Warranty of Habitability-Some New
Breakthroughs, 2 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 49, 63 (1970). See generally, Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 646 (1971).
63. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 667. Statewide building and hous-
ing codes are contained in the "State Housing Law," CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE
§§17910-17995, and the rules and regulations contained in CAL. ADMrN. CODE tit.
25, ch. 1, which are adopted by the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment, State of California, pursuant to its statutory authority expressed in CAL. HEALTH
AND SAFETY CODE §17921. Authorization for cities and counties to adopt local build-
ing and housing codes is contained in CAL. HEALTH AND SA ETY CODE §17951.
The distinction should be made between duties imposed by law which are enforce-
able by civil authorities and those duties which are enforceable directly in a con-
tractual relation. The building and housing codes have always been duties enforceable
by the administrative authorities (i.e., either by abatement of nuisance pursuant to
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§17980-17989 or by criminal prosecution pursuant
to CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §17995). The Hinson case held that they are
duties enforceable contractually by the tenant as well.
64. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
65. This problem in awaiting "judge made" law to correct the deficiencies in resi-
dential landlord-tenant law is summarized by Professor Powell:
Mhe financial smallness of the involved rights results in a great dearth of
reported decisions from the courts concerning them. Their legal consequences
are chiefly fixed in the "over the counter" mass handling of "landlord and ten-
ant" cases of the local courts. So this type of estate, judged sociologically, is
of great importance, but judged on the basis of jurisprudial content, is al-
most negligible.
2 R. POWELL, TaE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 253, at 374 (Rohan rev. 1971) [herein-
after cited as POWELL].
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In comparison with the duty created by the implied warranty of
habitability, the Act provides that a "landlord shall comply with the re-
quirements of applicable building and housing codes materially affect-
ing health and safety." 6  It is suggested that by limiting compliance
with the codes to those factual situations in which noncompliance
would "materially affect health and safety," the determination of the
duty will be facilitated. Furthermore, it appears that the scope of the
landlord's duty is more limited under the Act than its potential recog-
nition under Hinson because "materially affecting health and safety"
is more restrictive than "substantial compliance" with those codes
which are "relevant" to and "affect" a tenant's dwelling.
In addition to the implied warranty of habitability, 67 a landlord is
required by statute in California to provide substantially the same ser-
vices and facilities with the premises as are required under the Act.08
66. URLTA §2.104(a)(1). "Building and housing codes," as used in the Act, is
"intended to include all such codes whether enacted or promulgated under federal,
state or local authority." URLTA §1.301(2), Comment.
67. In those California appellate jurisdictions which have recognized it.
68. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §1941.1: A dwelling shall be deemed untenant-
able for purposes of Section 1941 if it substantially lacks any of the following af-
firmative standard characteristics:
(a) Effective waterproofing and weather protection of roof and exterior
walls, including unbroken windows and doors.
(b) Plumbing facilities which conformed to applicable law in effect at the
time of installation, maintained in good working order.
(c) A water supply approved under applicable law, which is under the
control of the tenant, capable of producing hot and cold running water, or a
system which is under the control of the landlord, which produces hot and
cold running water, furnished to appropriate fixtures, and connected to a sew-
age disposal system approved under applicable law.
(d) Heating facilities which conformed with applicable law at the time of
installation, maintained in good working order.
(e) Electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment which con-
formed with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good
working order.
(f) Building, grounds and appurtenances at the time of the commencement
of the lease or rental agreement in every part clean, sanitary, and free from
all accumulation of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents and vermin, and
all areas under control of the landlord kept in every part clean, sanitary,
and free from all accumulations of debris, filth, rubbish, garbage, rodents,
and vermin.
(g) An adequate number of appropriate receptacles for garbage and rubbish,
in clean condition and good repair at the time of commencement of the
lease or rental agreement, with the landlord providing appropriate serviceable
receptacles thereafter, and being responsible for the clean condition and good
repair of such receptacles under his control.
(h) Floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.
with URLTA §2.104(a) (2)-(6): The landlord shall...
(2) make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition;
(3) keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition;
(4) maintain in good and safe working order and condition all electrical,
plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and other facili-
ties and appliances, including elevators, supplied or required to be supplied
by him;
(5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles and conveniences for the
removal of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the occu-
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However, these affirmative duties of the landlord under existing law
are conditioned upon performance of certain obligations by the ten-
ant."' The Act would have the effect of making these affirmative du-
ties of the landlord absolute. The Act allows the tenant and landlord
to agree that the tenant will perform certain of these duties of the land-
lord, but the opportunity for the tenant to assume these duties is more
restricted than under existing law.7°
B. Furnish Possession
With regard to the duty of the landlord to furnish the tenant with
possession of the premises at the beginning of the term, the Act has
virtually the same requirements as those contained in existing Califor-
nia law.71
C. Security Deposits
The Act limits security deposits demanded by the landlord to an
amount not in excess of one month's periodic rent.72  Though "security
deposit" is not defined in the Act, it is apparent that the term does not
include prepaid rent.73 The Act imposes the duty on the landlord of
accounting for the deposit to the tenant within 14 days after the termi-
nation of the rental agreement and of returning any excess after ap-
plying the deposit to accrued rent and damages caused by the tenant.
74
Retention of the deposit in violation of his duty subjects the landlord
to liability of twice the amount wrongfully withheld in addition to re-
turn of the deposit.
75
California law currently provides protection for the tenant as to se-
curity deposits by specifying those purposes to which it can be ap-
plied.76  No limitation is made on the amount of the deposit de-
pancy of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and
(6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of hot water at all times
and reasonable heat between October 1 and May 1 except where the building
that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that
purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is gen-
erated by an installation within the exclusive control of the tenant and sup-
plied by a direct public utility connection.
69. CAL. CIrv. CODE §1941.2. See generally, Comment, Landlord and Tenant:
Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 298 (1971).
70. Compare URLTA §2.104(b) & (c) with CAL. Civ. CODE §1942.1.
71. URLTA §2.103 as compared with Brandt v. Phillippi, 82 Cal. 640, 23 P. 122
(1890); CAL. CIV. CODE §1932. See 3 M.LER & STARR §1021.
72. URLTA §2.101(a).
73. See URLTA §2.101.
74. URLTA §2.101(b).
75. URLTA §2.101(c).
76. CAL. CIv. CODE §1950.5, as renumbered, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 618 (formerly,
CAL. CIV. CODE §1951). Section 1950.5 differs from the Act by allowing application
of the deposit to cleaning costs, as well as accrued rent and damages caused by the
breach.
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manded by the landlord. The statute requires return of the excess,
after making the allowable damage deductions, within two weeks of
termination of the tenancy. Retention of deposits in violation of his
duty subjects the landlord to liability for the amount wrongfully with-
held plus damages not to exceed $2 00.77
D. Disclosure of Identity of Landlord and Manager
The Act provides an affirmative duty upon the landlord and his
rental agent to disclose to the tenant the identity of the landlord and
the manager of the dwelling unit.78 Failure to disclose results in the
tenant being able to make service of process upon the agent on behalf
of the landlord and to require that the agent perform the obligations of
the landlord. 79  The practical effect of this section is to provide someone
who is responsible for performance of the landlord's obligations and
from whom the tenant can demand performance.8 0
California has recently adopted almost identical protection which
became effective July 1, 1973.81 The major difference is that the
California law is limited to dwelling complexes of more than two units.
TENANT'S OBLIGATIONS
A. Maintenance and Cleaning
As imposed by the Act, the obligations of the tenant to maintain and
clean the dwelling unit are very similar in substance to the duties of the
tenant under existing California law.82 Two important distinctions ex-
77. CAL. Civ. CODE §1950.5(f).
78. URLTA §2.102.
79. URLTA §2.102(c).
80. URLTA §2.102, Comment.
81. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§1961-1962.5, as enacted, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 941. See 4
PAC. L.J., REVIEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNiA LEGISLATION 590 (1973).
82. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §1941.2: No duty on the part of the lessor shall
arise under Section 1941 or 1942 if the lessee is in substantial violation of any of the
following affirmative obligations:
(1) To keep that part of the premises which he occupies and uses clean and
sanitary as the condition of the premises permits.
(2) To dispose from his dwelling unit of all rubbish, garbage and other
waste, in a clean and sanitary manner.
(3) To properly use and operate all electrical, gas and plumbing fixtures
and keep them as clean and sanitary as their condition permits.
(4) Not to permit any person on the premises, with his permission, to wil-
fully or wantonly destroy, deface, damage, impair or remove any part of the
structure or dwelling unit or the facilities, equipment, or appurtenances
thereto, nor himself do any such thing.
(5) To occupy the premises as his abode, utilizing portions thereof for
living, sleeping, cooking or dining purposes only which were respectively de-
signed or intended to be used for such occupancies.
with URLTA §3.101(2)-(7): The tenant shall ...
(2) keep that part of the premises that he occupies and uses as clean and
safe as the condition of the premises permit;
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ist. First, the tenant's obligations under Civil Code Section 1941.2,
though referred to as "affirmative obligations," serve only as conditions
precedent to the landlord's duty to maintain and are not enforceable by
the landlord. The legal effect of the tenant's "substantial violation"
of these obligations is to excuse the landlord from his statutory duty to
maintain tenantable premises.8 3 By providing that these duties are
owed directly to the landlord, the Act would make these duties of the
tenant meaningful as far as the landlord is concerned and in effect
would impose enforceable obligations which heretofore did not exist.
It should be noted that in every lease situation under California law
the lessee has a duty to repair deteriorations or injuries occasioned by
his want of ordinary care84 and to make such incidental repairs as
would be included in the use of ordinary care for the preservation of
the demised premises.8 5  Though these are affirmative duties of the
tenant which are enforceable by the landlord, the standard of these
duties is so indefinite 6 as to make the duties of little practical effect to
the landlord, particularly when compared to those maintenance ob-
ligations provided by the Act.
The second distinction between the maintenance obligations of the
tenant under the Act and present California law is that Section 3.101
(1) requires that the tenant comply with those "obligations primarily
imposed upon tenants by applicable provisions of building and hous-
ing codes materially affecting health and safety." Even though a Cali-
fornia tenant may have duties imposed by the building and housing
codes which are enforceable by the proper officials, these duties are not
enforceable by the landlord (absent, of course, express provisions in
the rental agreement to the contrary). Moreover, there apparently
have not been any cases imposing an implied at law duty upon the
(3) dispose from his dwelling unit all ashes, rubbish, garbage, and other
waste in a clean and safe manner;
(4) keep all plumbing fixtures in the dwelling unit or used by the tenant as
clean as their condition permits;
(5) use in a reasonable manner all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating,
ventilating, air-conditioning and other facilities and appliances including ele-
vators in the premises;
(6) not deliberately or negligently destroy, deface, damage, impair or re-
move any part of the premises or knowingly permit any person to do so;
and
(7) conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with his
consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his neigh-
bors' peaceful enjoyment of the premises.
83. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1941, 1941.1. See text accompanying notes 178-79
infIra.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE §1929; Sewell (Glenn R.) Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Loverde,
70 Cal. 2d 666, 451 P.2d 721, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1969).
85. CAL. Civ. CODE §1928; 3 MILLER & STARR §1034.
86. It appears that the distinction of normal wear (non-actionable by the land-
lord) and want of ordinary care (actionable by the landlord) lacks clarity when
applied to a residential tenant.
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tenant similar to the implied warranty of habitability recognized in
Hinson. The effect of this provision of the Act would be to make
available additional duties of the tenant owed directly to the landlord.
B. Rules and Regulations
The Act requires that the tenant comply with the rules and regula-
tions adopted by the landlord provided that the rules and regulations
adopted are within the requirements of Section 3.102. Though there
is currently no statutory duty on the tenant to comply with the land-
lord's regulations, as a matter of practice rental agreements contain
covenants by the tenant to comply with all regulations.87  The net ef-
fect of the section would be to make the rules and regulations serve as
affirmative duties of the tenant if "the tenant has notice of [them] at
the time he enters the rental agreement, or when [they are subse-
quently] adopted,"' 8 and without the necessity of having a covenant to
that effect in the rental agreement. The landlord would be restricted
by relatively general provisions as to the type of regulation he could
adopt.
Where a particular objective of the landlord would not qualify as a
proper purpose within the meaning of the section, presumably he could
include it as a direct covenant in the rental agreement in order to
make it binding upon the tenant. Section 3.102 does not purport to
be the exclusive means for imposing binding rules and regulations on
the tenant. It merely states that from "time to time," either before or
after the signing of the rental agreement, a landlord may adopt rules and
regulations which "are enforceable against a tenant [without a cove-
nant in the rental agreement] only if" they comply with the stated pro-
visions of the section. Section 1.401(a) of the Act allows inclusion in
the rental agreement of "terms and conditions not prohibited by this
Act or other rule of law." Presumably, as not prohibited by the Act, a
covenant to comply with conditions which are not within the enabling
requirements of Section 3.102 would still be enforceable. The Act
would thus provide the landlord with an additional means of enforcing
rules and regulations to those currently available.
C. Landlord's Access to Premises
The Act requires that the tenant is not to unreasonably withhold
consent to the landlord to enter the dwelling unit for specified pur-
87. See 3 MILLER & STARR §983; M. CARBONE, REPRESENTING LANDLORDS IN
UNLAwFm DETAINER ACTIONS 1 (1971).
88. URLTA §3.102(6).
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poses.89 Except when required by emergency or if impracticable, the
landlord shall give the tenant at least two days' notice prior to entry and
shall enter only at reasonable times.90 Under the Act reasonableness
would apparently balance the tenant's right to undisturbed possession of
his dwelling unit with the landlord's necessity to enter for legitimate pur-
poses in connection with his obligations or reversionary interest.91
Absent agreement to the contrary in the rental agreement, California
follows the common law rule that a tenant has the right to the exclusive
possession of the premises and has no duty requiring him to allow the
landlord to enter.92 The exception has evolved that the landlord
does have a right to enter to perform any duty imposed either by
statute9 3 or by the rental agreement.94
D. Use of Premises Limited to Dwellhng Unit
Unless otherwise agreed, the Act requires that the tenant shall use
his premises only as a dwelling unit.95 By statute, California has a
similar provision which releases the landlord from his statutorily im-
posed maintenance obligations when the tenant uses the premises for
other than a dwelling unit.98 The effect of either law is the same:
use as a dwelling unit is a prerequisite for the application of special resi-




The most significant effect of the Act upon California landlord-
tenant relations would result from the remedy provisions contained in
Article IV. As has been discussed, the parties' duties imposed by the
Act do not radically differ from those imposed under existing Califor-
89. URLTA §3.103.
90. URLTA §3.103(c).
91. Le. as specified under URLTA §3.103(a): inspection, repairs, and exhibi-
tion to prospective tenants and owners.
92. 3 MILLER & STARR § 1021.
93. Le., CAL. CIv. CODE §1941; Dwyer v. Carroll, 86 Cal. 298, 24 P. 1015
(1890).
94. 3 MILLER & STARR § 1021.
95. URLTA §3.104.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE §1941.2(a) (5).
97. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act contains substantive
and procedural provisions regulating leases of property for residential pur-
poses. It is limited to property demised for dwelling purposes. It is, there-
fore, a special act rather than one of general application to all tenancies.
It is well established that special laws dealing with particular subjects con-
trol and take precedence over general statutes covering the same subject
[see Burum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 30 Cal. 2d 575, 586, 184 P.2d 505, 510
(1947)].
Letter from Legislative Counsel of California, George H. Murphy, to Assemblyman
Charles Warren, Aug. 31, 1972.
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nia law. However, similar comparison of the parties' remedies graphi-
cally demonstrates the significance of the Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act.
CONTRACTUAL ASPECT OF REMEDIES
A. Damages
In establishing a policy of broad construction of the remedies pro-
visions, the Act specifies, "The remedies provided by this Act shall be
so administered that the aggrieved party may recover appropriate dam-
ages."98  In comparison, California law, recognizing the contractual
aspect of the lease,99 allows recovery of damages to the aggrieved party
for the breach of an express covenant in a rental agreement 0" and for
the breach of the traditionally implied covenants of the lease, i.e., de-
livery of possession at the commencement of the term' 01 and assurance
of quiet enjoyment.'0 2 With respect to the implied warranty of ha-
bitability set forth in Hinson, the tenant in effect recovers damages by
way of an offset in rent; the rent is reduced to the reasonable rental
value of the premises for the period of the violation.' 03 On the other
hand, failure to comply with the significant affirmative duties imposed
by statute (Civil Code Section 1941), at least to the extent that there
is a remedy provided by statute (Civil Code Section 1942), does not
give rise to a cause of action to the aggrieved party for recovery of
damages. 104 The Act would thus change California law to allow re-
covery of damages for the breach of a duty recognized by the Act re-
gardless of how the duty was created.
B. Duty to Mitigate
Section 1.105(a) of the Act continues, "The aggrieved party has a
duty to mitigate damages." The comment to this section states that
this provision is intended "to make clear that damages must be mini-
98. URLTA §1.105.
99. CAL. Crv. CODE §1925.
100. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 672, 155
P.2d 24, 28 (1944); Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411,
434, 132 P.2d 457, 470 (1942); 3 MiLur- & STARR §995.
101. Brandt v. Phillippi, 82 Cal. 640, 23 P. 122 (1890); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d
1024 (1963) (measure of damages).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE §1927; McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 70, 48 P. 984, 986
(1897); Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954); Annot., 41
A.L.R.2d 1414, 1454 (1955) (measure of damages).
103. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
104. "mhe extent of the privilege conferred upon the tenant" for the landlord's
noncompliance with his duties under CAL. Civ. CODE §1941 is contained in CAL. CIV.
CODE §1942. Van Every v. Ogg, 59 Cal. 563, 566 (1881); Comment, Landlord and
Tenant Law. Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA LAw. 298, 303 (1971).
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mized,"'10 5 presumably in accordance with the contractual doctrine
concerning avoidable damages.10 6
In connection with residential leases, the situation in which the issue
of mitigation has been most often considered is when a tenant aban-
dons the premises and the landlord brings an action to recover rent
accruing after the abandonment without having attempted to relet.
By case law California recognized the common law view that a land-
lord has no duty to mitigate damages caused by the tenant's abandon-
ment; the landlord could allow the premises to remain vacant and
bring an action to recover rent obligations owed by the tenant as they
became due.107  By statutory enactment applicable only to this aban-
donment situation, a limitation has now been placed on the landlord's
permissible recovery which is analogous to a duty to mitigate: i.e., a
landlord's recovery is limited to only that rental loss becoming due
after the tenant's abandonment which the landlord can not reasonably
avoid.' 08  However, when the breach of the rental agreement is other
than abandonment by the tenant, it is uncertain whether California
law limits either party's recovery to only unavoidable damages. 109 The
Act would remove this uncertainty and provide seemingly more realis-
tic limitations upon a party's recovery.
Generally, perhaps it can be stated that Section 1.105(a) of the Act,
when considered with the elimination of independent covenants to be
discussed shortly, would remove the remaining vestiges of the convey-
ance aspect of a lease and provide remedies analogous to those for
contract.
TENANT'S REMEDIES
A. Landlord's Noncompliance with Rental Agreement or
Maintenance and Service Obligations under the Act
The tenant has the choice of several remedies when there is non-
105. URLTA §1.105, Comment.
106. 5 A. CoRniN, CoNTrcrs §§1039-53 (1964).
107. De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 832, 161 P.2d 453, 455 (1945); Phillips-
Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless Stages, Inc., 210 Cal. 253, 258, 291 P. 178, 180 (1930);
B.K.K. Co. v. Schultz, 7 Cal. App. 3d 786, 790, 86 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762 (1970); Annot.,
21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1951-1951.4, effective as to leases or rental agreements
entered into or renewed after July 1, 1971.
109. Consider Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 P. 765 (1925), wherein
for the breach of a landlord's covenant to repair, the tenant is recognized as having
the choice either of an action for damages or of making repairs and recovering the
expense from the landlord; however, no consideration is given in the decision that the
tenant exercise his choice with an attempt to minimize damages. Accord, Mills v.
Ruppert, 167 Cal. App. 2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (1959); 3A G. THOMPSON, MODERN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §1236 (repl. ed. 1959); Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446 (1953).
But see, Hoag v. Jenan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 556, 565, 195 P.2d 451, 457 (1948), for
the implication that when the tenant does not exercise reasonable care to minimize
damage, the recovery of damages resulting from landlord's breach of covenant may
be reduced.
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compliance by the landlord with the rental agreement or with his
maintenance and service obligations imposed by the Act. Except
where otherwise provided by the Act, a tenant may recover actual
damages and obtain injunctive relief for such noncompliance. °10 As
an alternative, when the reasonable cost of correcting a minor defect
caused by the landlord's noncompliance is less than a given limit,"'
the tenant may correct the condition and deduct the reasonable ex-
penses from his rent so long as he has allowed the landlord 14 days to
correct after written notice of his intent to resort to self-help."
2
In addition to the tenant's choice of damages or repair-and-deduct,
when there is a "material" noncompliance by the landlord with the
rental agreement or a noncompliance with his maintenance and service
obligations imposed by the Act which "materially affects health or
safety," the tenant may terminate the rental agreement 30 days after
written notice to the landlord of the noncompliance and of his intent to
terminate if not corrected within 14 days of receipt of the notice."'
By the landlord correcting his noncompliance within 14 days, the con-
dition is cured and there is no longer a right to terminate." 4  If the
same noncompliance by the landlord recurs within six months the
tenant may terminate 14 days after written notice to the landlord of the
noncompliance and of his intent to terminate."1 Apparently in this
instance the landlord's correction of the noncompliance after notice
will not prevent termination. The tenant may not terminate for a
condition caused by the deliberate or negligent act or omission of the
tenant, a member of his family, or other person on the premises with
his consent.""
The tenant has a choice of three additional remedies when the land-
lord's noncompliance is a wrongful failure to supply essential services
(i.e., "heat, running water, hot water, electric, gas, or other essential
services")." T These special remedies are an alternative to damages,
110. URLTA §4.101(b).
111. $100 or one-half of the periodic rent, whichever is greater.
112. URLTA §4.103(a).
113. URLTA §4.101(a). Such noncompliance with the rental agreement must
be material and presumably contractual considerations of materiality are appropriate
as the Act is silent as to the definition of material. Similarly, materially affecting
health and safety is the undefined standard for noncompliance with statutory duties
giving cause to terminate.
114. URLTA §4.101(a). The language of this section is not free from ambiguity.
Subsection 4.101(a)(1) provides that if the landlord remedies the noncompliance
"before the date specified in the notice," the rental agreement shall not terminate.
But the only date specified in Section 4.101(a) which is required in the notice is
"a date not less than 30 days after receipt of the notice" upon which the rental
agreement will terminate. A literal interpretation of Section 4.101(a) would result in
the landlord being able to prevent a termination by remedying a breach anytime
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repair-and-deduct, and termination discussed thus far. First, the
tenant may procure such reasonable amounts of essential services as
are necessary and deduct their actual and reasonable cost from the
rent. Secondly, the tenant may recover damages based upon the dimi-
nution in the fair rental value of the dwelling unit. Thirdly, the
tenant may procure reasonable substitute housing during the period of
the landlord's noncompliance, in which case the tenant is excused from
paying rent for the period and may recover the reasonable cost of the
substitute housing not in excess of an amount equal to the periodic
rent. However, none of these remedies is available until the tenant has
given the landlord written notice of the condition.118
B. Landlord's Noncompliance with Rental Agreement and Statutory
Maintenance Duties under California Law
1. Breach of Covenant
In comparison to the tenant's remedies under the Act for the land-
lord's noncompliance with the rental agreement, California law allows
a tenant to recover damages for the breach of an express or implied
covenant in a rental agreement.119 However, with regard to the ten-
ant's right to terminate for a landlord's breach, the covenant breached
by the landlord must be found to be dependent with the tenant's cove-
nant to pay rent.'2 0  California law is said to have progressed from a
strict doctrine of independent covenants 21 to a position that cove-
nants are dependent and mutual when they run to the "entire consid-
eration of the contract" as distinguished from covenants merely inci-
dental to the main purpose of the lease. 22  It is questionable to what
extent the doctrine of independent covenants has been abrogated,
however, as cases still hold that the landlord's covenant to repair and
the tenant's covenant to pay rent are considered independent. 23
Once the covenants are found to be mutual and dependent, the
landlord's material breach excuses the tenant from further perfor-
mance of his rent covenant and allows him the right to terminate
by vacating the premises.
118. URLTA §4.104(d).
119. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
120. 3 MILLER & STARR §§995, 996.
121. See I AMRICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.11 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 PoWELL
221[1], n.11.
122. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155 P.2d 24
(1944); Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d
457 (1942); 3 MILLER & STARR §996.
123. Compare the decisions of different California district courts of appeal: Ho-
sang v. Minor, 205 Cal. App. 2d 269, 22 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1962) (holding that the
covenants were independent); Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611,
34 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1963) (holding that the covenants were dependent). It would
appear that a habitable and adequately maintained dwelling unit is the essence of the
consideration bargained for by the residential tenant. See Mosnovrrz ET AL. at B80.
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If the breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment results in
constructive eviction, the tenant has two hurdles to overcome. First,
he must determine whether the landlord's interference does in fact
amount to constructive eviction which gives him the right to terminate.
Secondly, if constructively evicted, he must physically vacate the prem-
ises within a reasonable time or his right to terminate is said to be
waived.
124
It would thus appear that the Act would have no effect on a tenant's
right to recover damages for the breach of a covenant in the rental
agreement. However, by removing the hurdles of the doctrines of in-
dependent covenants and constructive eviction, the Act would provide
substantially more opportunity for the tenant to terminate. The limita-
tion would be the necessity that the breaches of the landlord be ma-
terial.
2. Failure to Maintain Tenantable Dwelling
Currently, for a tenant to acquire remedies for the landlord's non-
compliance with his statutory duty of providing tenantable premises,
the landlord's noncompliance must be "substantial."' 25 Where sub-
stantial, the tenant has the choice of alternative remedies after notify-
ing the landlord of the untenantable condition and allowing the land-
lord a reasonable time to repair. 26 The tenant may vacate the prem-
ises and be discharged from his rent obligation. As to this course of
action, it appears the Act would only substitute "materially affecting
health and safety" for "substantially" in determining whether there
was a right to terminate.
The tenant alternatively may make the repairs necessary to correct
the condition and deduct the expenses from the rent. The deduction
of expenditures is limited to a value of not more than one month's
rent, and the remedy is available only once in a 12-month period.
Thus under the Act the amount of deductible expenditures allowed
for any single defect could conceivably be less;127 but because the
remedy under the Act may be used more than once a year, the total
effect of the remedy provided by the Act would be more advantageous
to the tenant. Again, "materially affecting health and safety" replaces
124. 3 MILLER & STARR §1022.
125. CAL. CIV. CODE §1941.1.
126. CAL. CIV. CODE §1942. A tenant who allows the landlord 30 days to re-
pair is presumed to have allowed the landlord a reasonable time for the purpose of
this section. This is similar to the 30-day notice requirement for the right to terminate
under the Act but longer than the 14-day notice requirement for perfection of the
right to repair-and-deduct under the Act.
127. See note 111 supra.
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"substantially" as the standard by which to determine actionable non-
compliance.
Since, as previously discussed, noncompliance with his maintenance
and service obligations imposed by California statutes (i.e., Civil Code
Section 1941) does not subject a landlord to liability for damages to
the tenant,128 the Act would bestow on the tenant an additional rem-
edy heretofore unavailable in California. Furthermore, California has
no statutory provision similar to the three remedies available under the
Act129 for the landlord's failure to provide essential services.
3. Failure to Comply with Building and Housing Codes
In comparing remedies available for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability under Hinson v. Delis with those available for failure to
comply with building and housing codes under the Act, 3 ' the offset
for rent allowed in Hinson is analogous to damages allowed under the
Act.' 31 There is language in Hinson suggesting that the implied cove-
nant is mutually dependent with the covenant to pay rent; thus a ma-
terial breach of the implied covenant would also be a cause for the ten-
ant's termination.132  There is no discussion of a repair-and-deduct rem-
edy in Hinson, though presumably one would be available in a court
accepting the Hinson rationale.' 3 3 In summary, it appears that poten-
128. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
129. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra for the extent of the duty im-
posed.
131. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
132. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666 ("In considering the ma-
teriality of an alleged breach, both the seriousness of the claimed defect and the
length of time for which it persists are relevant factors").
In Hinson, "the plaintiff sought a judicial declaration that she 'is obliged to make
rental payments only after the defendant complies with his duty to substantially obey
the housing codes and make the premises habitable."' 26 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 666-67. In rendering its decision, the court was not called upon to
discuss what other remedies would be available to the tenant. It appears that as "the
tenant is not absolved from liability for all rent but remains liable for the reasonable
rental value of the premises....." 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666, the
breach of the implied warranty of habitability excuses part of the tenant's obligation
for rent under the contractual theory of dependent covenants. See Hicks, The Con-
tractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 464-69 (1972),
wherein the implied warranty of habitability is considered as mutually dependent with
the covenant to pay rent.
Other cases commented upon with approval in Hinson shed more light on the
remedies available for breach of the implied warranty of habitability. In Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969), the court indicated that the "basic
contract remedies of damages, reformation, and rescission" would be available. The
court in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1073, 1082 n.61 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), held that "the breach of this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for
breach of contract," including specific performance. See Moskovitz, supra note 65,
at 65-67, for a discussion of the remedies available for breach of this implied war-
ranty.
133. For the breach of an express covenant by the landlord to make repairs, the
tenant has the choice of bringing an action to recover damages caused by the breach
or of making the repairs necessary and deducting the reasonable expenses of such re-
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tially the same choice of remedies exists under Hinson as is available
under the Act when there has been a failure by the landlord to comply
with the building and housing codes.
In summarizing the remedies available to the tenant for the land-
lord's noncompliance with his maintenance and service obligations, it
appears that stronger remedies exist under the Act than under Cali-
fornia law.
C. Landlord's Failure to Deliver Possession
When the landlord fails to deliver possession of the premises at the
beginning of the term, the Act provides that rent abates until posses-
sion is delivered and that the tenant has a choice of two remedies .
84
He may terminate the tenancy upon five days' written notice to the
landlord of his intent'to do so and obtain a refund of prepaid rent
and security deposits. Alternatively, the tenant may demand per-
formance of the rental agreement by the landlord and maintain an ac-
tion for possession and damages against the party wrongfully with-
holding possession. "If the person's failure to deliver possession is
willful and not in good faith, an aggrieved person may recover an
amount not more than three months' periodic rent or threefold actual
damages, whichever is greater ... ."' An "aggrieved person" is
intended to include a landlord suing a holdover tenant for possession
and damages." 8"
Under California law for the failure of the landlord to deliver pos-
session, the tenant has remedies similar to those under the Act. The
tenant may abandon the lease, thereby terminating his obligation to
pay rent,1 7 and recover damages from the landlord for breach of the
rental agreement. 138 Alternatively, the tenant may bring an ejectment
action to recover possession'89 and damages caused by the wrongful
withholding of the property.'"4 However, as treble damages appar-
pairs from the rent. Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 P. 765 (1925);
3A G. THOMPSON, MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTr §1236 (repl. ed. 1959); Annot.,
28 A.L.R.2d 446, 464 (1953). By analogy, it would appear that the same repair-and-




136. URLTA §4.102, Comment.
137. Brandt v. Phillippi, 82 Cal. 640, 23 P. 122 (1890); 3 MILLER & STARR
§1021.
138. Kaye v. Melzer, 87 Cal. App. 2d 299, 197 P.2d 50 (1948); 30 CAL. JoR.
2d Landlord and Tenant §111 (1956).
139. Camarillo v. Fenlon, 49 Cal. 202 (1874); 30 CAL. Jui. 2d Landlord and
Tenant §111 (1956).
140. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §740; CAL. CIrv. CoDE §3334; 17 CAL. JuR. 2d Eject-
ment §§56-58 (rev. ed. 1968).
1973 / Uniform Landlord-Tenant Act
ently are not available when the landlord withholds possession in bad
faith in California, 1' the Act would thus provide an additional
method by which the tenant could prevent the landlord from withhold-
ing possession at the commencement of the term.
D. Wrongful Exclusion from Possession
If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from the
premises or willfully interrupts essential services, the tenant may, un-
der the Act, recover possession or terminate the tenancy and, in either
case, recover an amount not more than three months' periodic rent or
treble damages, whichever is greater.142  The purpose of the section is
to prevent the unlawful ouster of the tenant. The section appears
complementary to the remedy provided in the situation when there is
a willful failure by the landlord to deliver possession at the com-
mencement of the tenancy. 4 3 Moreover, it appears to be cumulative
to the remedies allowed for failure of the landlord to supply essential
services as part of his maintenance and service obligations discussed
previously.'44
California forcible entry and detainer statutes provide a summary
means by which the tenant can reacquire possession and receive an
award for the value of the use deprived. 4 5 When malice is shown,
treble damages are awardable in the discretion of the trier of fact. 4 "
When there is an intentional interruption of essential services by the
landlord in an attempt to terminate the tenancy, the tenant is provided
remedies without regard to whether the ouster attempt is successful.
The tenant may recover his actual damages and $100 per day for the
period of the interruption. 4 7  The purpose of these California laws
is the same as that of the Act (i.e., to prevent unlawful ouster),
though the practical effect of either will vary with the economics of
the situation.
E. Unlawful Entry
If the landlord makes an unlawful entry on the tenant's premises,
or a lawful entry in an unreasonable manner including repeated de-
mands for entry which have the effect of unreasonably harassing the
141. 17 CAL. Jtm. 2d Ejectment § §56-58 (rev. ed. 1968).
142. URLTA §4.107.
143. See text accompanying notes 134-36 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
145. CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. §1159 et seq.; Jordon v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597,
361 P.2d 20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1961); 3 MILLER & STAR §§1023-30.
146. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1174; 3 MILLER & STARR §1030.
147. CAL. Civ. CODE §789.3.
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tenant, the tenant under the Act may obtain injunctive relief or termi-
nate the tenancy. 148  In either case, the tenant can recover actual dam-
ages.
Though California law recognizes the tenant's right to exclusive
possession, it probably takes continual interference by the landlord be-
fore the tenant can claim constructive eviction as a basis for terminat-
ing the tenancy.14 9 Whether as damages caused by constructive evic-
tion amounting to a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, or as damages under a trespassory interference with the tenant's
right to exclusive possession, actual damages are recoverable by the
tenant.150
F. Destruction of the Premises by Casualty
The Act provides the tenant with alternative remedies when the
premises are destroyed or partially destroyed by fire or other casu-
alty.15  He can immediately vacate the premises and notify the land-
lord of his intent to terminate the rental agreement, in which case it
terminates as of the date of the vacating. Alternatively, if continued
occupancy is lawful, he can vacate any part of the premises rendered
unusable, in which case his liability for rent is reduced in proportion to
the decrease in the fair rental value.
Absent a covenant of the landlord to repair or rebuild, in California
the tenant may terminate the rental agreement when the premises are
totally destroyed' 52 or when the principal part of the premises is de-
stroyed."6 8 Even when the principal part is not destroyed, the tenant
can terminate if the landlord's failure to repair causes the premises to
be "substantially untenantable."' 54  However, destruction of a lesser
magnitude has not been an excuse for termination. When the tenant
justifiably terminates, he is relieved of future rent liability but he may
not recover prepaid rent.' 5 When the tenant does not terminate but
remains in occupancy of part of the premises, he has not been relieved
of any portion of his rent liability, primarily because rent is not appor-
tionable as to area. 6 However, it would appear that in view of Hin-
148. URLTA §4.302(b).
149. 3 MLLER & STARR §§1021-22.
150. CAL. Crv. CODE §§1927, 3334; McDowell v. Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 P. 984
(1897); Roberts v. Casey, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 92 P.2d 654 (1939).
151. URLTA §4.106.
152. CAL. Civ. CoODE §1933(4); see 3 MLvER & STAu§1058.
153. CAL. Cirv. CODE §1932(2).
154. Breach of the landlord's duty pursuant to CAL. CiV. CODE §1941.1 giving
the tenant the option to terminate under CAL. Civ. CODE §1942.
155. Pedro v. Potter, 197 Cal. 751, 761, 242 P. 926, 931 (1926).
156. See Still Properties, Inc. v. CMAG, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 42, 50-51, 33
Cal. Rptr. 155, 160 (1963); Knoblaugh v. McKinney, 5 Cal. App. 2d 339, 42 P.2d
332 (1935).
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son, any destruction of the premises not corrected by the landlord
which amounts to a substantial noncompliance with the building and
housing codes would reduce the tenant's rent liability to the fair
rental value of the premises.15
7
G. Right to Counterclaim in Summary Action
Under the Act, in an action for possession based upon the nonpay-
ment of rent or in an action for rent when the tenant is in possession,
the tenant may counterclaim for any amount which he may recover
under the Act or rental agreement. 158  The court may require the
tenant to continue paying all or part of the rent accruing into court
pending resolution of the conflicting claims. If no rent is found to be
owing to the landlord after deducting the amount of the tenant's suc-
cessful counterclaim, the tenant may maintain possession. In an action
for rent when the tenant is not in possession, the tenant is not required
to pay any rent into court as a prerequisite to maintaining his counter-
claim.'5 9
In California the landlord's action for rent and for possession based
upon breach of any of the tenant's covenants is summary in nature, 6 '
thus traditionally excluding from litigation within the same action the
affirmative defenses and counterclaims of the tenant.' 6' However,
recently courts have been more willing to allow affirmative defenses of
the tenant, particularly those which are "equitable" in nature.'62 The
potential for greater allowance of counterclaims came in Hinson in
which the court recognized the right of the tenant to plead, as an offset
to rent allegedly owing, the reduction in fair rental value of the prem-
ises caused by landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. Though it was an action for declaratory relief, Hinson apparently
opens the door to a full trial in the "summary" proceeding of unlawful
detainer.1 62a In recognizing the damage potential to the landlord re-
sulting from elimination of the "summary" aspect, 63 the Hinson court
provided protection to the landlord by compelling the tenant to continue
making payments of rent to the court during the course of the action.
16 4
157. See Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
158. URLTA §4.105(a).
159. URLTA §4.105(b).
160. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1161 et seq.
161. 3 MLLER & STAM § 1092.
162. See collection of cases in MosKovrrz ET AL. §§9.2-9.34.
162a. However, in the recently reported case of Murdock v. Lofton, 31 Cal. App.
3d 981, 107 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1973), hg. granted, California Supreme Court, June 30,
1973 (S.F. 23024), the court held that the breach of the implied warranty of habitability
could not be raised by the tenant as an affirmative defense in an unlawful detainer action.
163. The damages caused by a tenant not capable of paying rent (e.g., "judgment
proof") can be great if he is allowed to remain in possession during a full length trial
without having to post some form of security.
164. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
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The position of the California courts is admittedly in a state of rapid
change as to which defenses and counterclaims are admissible in an
unlawful detainer action and as to what protection should be provided
the landlord. However, the Act appears to represent the logical cul-
mination of the developing concepts of California courts. 105
LANDLORD'S REmDIES
A. Tenant's Noncompliance with Rental Agreement or Maintenance
and Cleaning Obligations under the Act
For the tenant's noncompliance with the rental agreement or with
his maintenance obligations under the Act, the landlord's remedies
are analogous to those provided the tenant in event of landlord's non-
compliance. Except as otherwise provided by the Act, the landlord
can recover actual damages and obtain injunctive relief for the non-
compliance of the tenant.166 Alternatively and analogous to the ten-
ant's repair-and-deduct remedy, the landlord may enter the tenant's
dwelling unit to correct any condition materially affecting health and
safety which was caused by the tenant's noncompliance and which
was not corrected within 14 days of written notice from the land-
lord.1 67  The landlord can charge the tenant for the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in such repairs as additional rent.
In addition to the landlord's choice of damages or repair-and-deduct,
when there is a "material" noncompliance by the tenant with the rental
agreement or noncompliance with any of his maintenance and cleaning
obligations imposed by the Act which "materially affects health and
safety," the landlord may terminate the tenancy after 30 days' written
notice of the condition to the tenant provided that the tenant does
not correct the condition within 14 days of receipt of the notice.'6 8
If substantially the same noncompliance of the tenant recurs within
six months, the landlord may terminate the tenancy after 14 days' no-
tice and without providing the tenant with an opportunity to prevent
the termination by correcting the default.' 69
When the noncompliance with the rental agreement is the failure to
pay rent, the landlord must allow the tenant 14 days to pay after re-
ceipt of a written notice indicating delinquent rent and the landlord's
165. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), implying that the determination of the tenant's right to maintain posses-
sion under the implied warranty concept (i.e. tenant can maintain possession if no
rent is owing after deducting the value of offset caused by the landlord's breach) is
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intent to terminate. Failure of the tenant to pay within that period
provides the landlord the right to terminate immediately.110
B. Tenant's Noncompliance with Rental Agreement or Statutory
Maintenance Duties under California Law
1. Breach of Covenants
Under existing California law, a landlord has a right to damages for
the tenant's breach of his covenants in a rental agreement as already
has been discussed.1 71  As to the landlord's ability to terminate, the
problem with the doctrine of independent covenants is avoided by:
first, the customary practice of the landlord in making all covenants
of the tenant also express conditions, 71 failure of which justifies termi-
nation by the landlord; secondly, the procedural advantage of an un-
lawful detainer action which allows the landlord to terminate for the
nonpayment of rent1 73 or for the tenant's breach of any other cove-
nant in the rental agreement. 1 4  However, because the law abhors for-
feitures, courts have refused to allow the landlord to terminate in un-
lawful detainer actions when the tenant has substantially complied
with his covenants.1 75  This is similar to the requirement under the
Act that the noncompliance with the rental agreement must be "ma-
terial" before the landlord can terminate.
It appears that the Act would not cause significant changes in the
substantive right of the landlord to recover damages and to terminate
the rental agreement for the tenant's breach of covenants. However,
the extensive delay in the perfection of the right to terminate would
reduce its effectiveness. The Act requires that the tenant must be al-
lowed 14 days after notice to cure the alleged breach whereas current
law only requires three days.176 When the breach is not cured, the Act
provides that the landlord can not terminate until at least 30 days after
notice of the condition to the tenant (i.e., 16 days after expiration of
the period in which the tenant has to cure). Under existing law, the
landlord may declare a termination and commence action to remove
170. URLTA §4.201(b).
171. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
172. M. CARBONE, REPRESENTING LANDLORDS IN UNLAwFUL DETAINER ACTIONs 1
(1971).
173. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §1161(2).
174. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §1161(3). To take advantage of the statutory right
to terminate, the landlord must include wording in the three day notice that indicates
his election to terminate the lease. Neuhaus v. Norgard, 140 Cal. App. 735, 739-40,
35 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1934); MSKovrrz ET AL. §§15.17-15.18.
175. McNeece v. Wood, 204 Cal. 280, 285, 267 P. 877, 880 (1928); Randol v.
Scott, 110 Cal. 590, 597, 42 P. 976, 978 (1895); Knight v. Black, 19 Cal. App. 518,
526, 126 P. 512, 515 (1912); MosKovrrz ET AL. §§3.34-3.37.
176. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1161.
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the tenant from possession immediately upon expiration of the period
in which the tenant has to cure (i.e., three days after notice of the condi-
tion).17
7
2. Breach of the Statutory Duty to Maintain
As there is presently no remedy available to the landlord for the
tenant's noncompliance with his statutory duty to maintain the dwell-
ig unit,17 8 except in situations in which the noncompliance constitutes
waste, 170 the Act's allowance for damages and the right to terminate
for a noncompliance which "materially affects health and safety"
would be an extension of the landlord's remedies. As a practical mat-
ter because rental agreements are generally written by landlords and
contain these same duties as express covenants, this extension would
arguably not be of any practical significance in broadening the land-
lord's effective remedies.
C. Exercise of the Right to Terminate
The Act provides that the landlord's right to terminate the rental
agreement is waived for a particular breach if the landlord accepts
rents after knowledge of the tenant's default or accepts performance
from the tenant which constitutes a variance from required perform-
ance.180 California law is substantially in accord.1
8 '
Whenever a rental agreement is terminated under the Act, the land-
lord has a cause of action for possession, rent owing, and damages
caused by the breach of the tenant's duties. 82 When the tenant
willfully and not in good faith holds over after the termination of the
tenancy, the landlord may recover not only possession but also dam-
ages of not more than three months' periodic rent or treble actual dam-
ages, whichever is greater. 8 3 The landlord is prohibited from taking
possession of the premises in any manner not specified by the Act. 84
Upon termination of a rental agreement under California law, a
landlord may bring an unlawful detainer action to obtain possession,
any rent due prior to termination, and any damages caused by reten-
tion of the premises after termination. 8 5 When the tenant's holdover
is willful and with malice, a landlord may be awarded treble damages
177. Id.
178. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1941.2.
179. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §732.
180. URLTA §4.204.




185. CAL. CODE CrV. PRoc. § 1174.
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in the discretion of the trier of fact.188  To recover any damages caused
by the tenant's breach of any covenant other than his rent covenant,
the landlord must initiate a separate non-summary action.
18 7
D. Abandonment by Tenant
The Act provides for the landlord's recovery of damages caused by
the tenant's abandonment of the premises but requires that the land-
lord use reasonable efforts to relet the premises. 188 This section is
basically in accord with existing California law.8 9
E. Landlord's Liens
The Act provides that a lien or security interest on behalf of the
landlord in the tenant's household goods is not enforceable. 90 The
implication is that liens acquired in accordance with state law on
property other than household goods are enforceable. California law
provides that most of a tenant's household goods are exempt from being
subject to a landlord's lien. 9'
F. Refusal of Lawful Access
Under the Act, if the tenant refuses to allow the landlord lawful ac-
cess, the landlord may obtain injunctive relief to compel access or
terminate the tenancy and, in either case, recover damages., 92 Under
California law the landlord does not have an express right of access to the
premises in the possession of the tenant;198 hence there is no cause to
terminate for tenant's refusal to admit. Although there is an implied
right of access for a landlord to perform his statutory maintenance obliga-
tions,194 it is probable that only an injunction would lie for the ten-
ant's denial of such access and not a cause to terminate. 95 When
there is a covenant by the tenant to allow access to the landlord,
breach of this covenant would be a cause for termination as with the
breach of any other covenant.
186. Id.
187. See MosKovrrz ET AL. §5.4.
188. URLTA §4.203(c).
189. CAL. CIV. CODE §1951.2; Comment, Landlord-Tenant Legislation: Revising
an Old Common Law Relationship, 2 PAc. L.J 259 (1971).
190. URLTA §4.205(a).
191. CAL. CIV. CODE §1861(a); 3 MILLER & STARR §1103.
192. URLTA §4.302(a). See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra for the obli-
gation of the tenant to allow the landlord access.
193. 3 MILLER & STARR §1021.
194. Dwyer v. Carroll, 86 Cal. 298, 24 P. 1015 (1890).
195. See id.; 3 MmLRm & STARR §1021.
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G. Retaliatory Remedies Prohibited
The landlord is prohibited by the Act from raising rent, decreasing
services, or bringing an action for possession under circumstances
which are retaliatory. 196 Retaliation is presumed where the landlord
exercises one of the above rights within one year after: 1) the tenant
has complained to authorities about the landlord's building and hous-
ing code violation; 2) the tenant has complained to the landlord con-
cerning violation of the landlord's maintenance obligations imposed by
the Act; or 3) the tenant has joined a tenants' union. 197 Notwith-
standing the above, retaliation is not presumed from the landlord
bringing an action for possession when: 1) the building and housing
code violation was caused primarily by lack of reasonable care by the
tenant; 2) the tenant is in default on rent; or 3) compliance with the
codes requires such alteration as would effectively deprive the tenant
of the use of the dwelling unit.198
Under California law, if the landlord has as his dominant purpose
retaliation against the tenant because of the exercise by the tenant of
a right to complain about or seek relief from untenantable conditions
of the premises, 9 9 the landlord can not for a period of 60 days in-
crease the rent, decrease any services, or cause the tenant to involun-
tarily quit.200 The California law has two significant limitations from
the tenant's perspective. First, apparently the landlord can cause the
tenant to quit after 60 days even where his dominant purpose is re-
taliation. Secondly, the protection of this law is available to the tenant
only once in a 12-month period. This review of the status of Califor-
nia's retaliatory eviction law is based upon the premise that the
broader protection afforded in Schweiger v. Superior Court is no
longer available after enactment of Civil Code Section 1942.5.2°1
If the tenant's defense is too restricted under California law, it ap-
pears conversely that the protection of the Act would be weighted too
heavily in favor of the tenant. Not only could the tenant raise the




199. Le., a) Complaint to the landlord pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE §1942; b)
complaint to governmental agency charged with enforcement of housing standards;
and c) resulting judicial or arbitration relief in favor of the tenant.
200. CAL. CIV. CODE §1942.5.
201. This conclusion is based on the negative implication that the California Leg-
islature by expressly providing a tenant 60-day protection, available only once in a
given year, intended to restrict the broader retaliatory eviction protection provided in
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
See Mosnovrrz ET AL. §9.27; Note, Retaliatory Eviction in California: The Legislature
Slams the Door and Boards Up the Windows, 46 So. CAL. L. RFV. 118 (1972).
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of retaliation after certain activities by the tenant appears unwar-
ranted. Perhaps the artificial retaliatory presumption periods (i.e., 60
days or one year) should be replaced by a case-by-case factual decision
on the issue of retaliation as in Schweiger.20 2 In that case the Califor-
nia Supreme Court suggested that the basis of the defense is to prevent
the landlord from "punishing" a tenant who exercises rights provided
him by law for the correction of housing conditions. 20 3 The timing of
the landlord's demand following the tenant's exercise of his rights is
only one factor to be considered in determining whether the landlord
is attempting to "punish" the tenant.
CONCLUSION
This comment has not attempted to discuss the various social and
equitable arguments for revising the legal relationship between landlord
and tenant. Any conclusion as to the appropriateness of the redistribu-
tion of the obligations and remedies which would result from adoption
of the Act necessarily involves many varied considerations beyond the
scope and purpose of this comment. It is possible, however, to make
certain objective conclusions as to the effect of adoption of the Act in
California. First, by the Act's thorough delineation of the obligations
and remedies of the parties, there is substantial clarification of the law
governing landlord-tenant relations. This is particularly true with regard
to maintenance and service obligations where the policy behind the im-
plied warranty concept is supported by definite standards. Secondly, the
Act more accurately reflects the expectations of the parties in that the ob-
ligations and remedies under the Act treat the rental agreement as a con-
tract for shelter and not a conveyance of an estate. Thirdly, clarifica-
tion of rights and reflection of expectations promote a more efficient
system. With improved understanding of their legal relationship when
they enter into the rental agreement, the parties are less likely to subse-
quently abuse the relationship. When there is a noncompliance, there
will be less uncertainty as to what the rights are without necessity of
professional legal assistance. Fourthly, efficiency of the system re-
sults in part from the restriction on the right to contract: certain
terms of the rental agreement are prohibited and the courts may
police for unconscionable terms. Fifthly, in that the obligations and
remedies of each party are expressed in reciprocal language, the Act
would appear to provide equality to the California law. The tenant
202. 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
203. See Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971);
MosKovrTz ET AL. §§9.25-9.30; Moskovitz, Retaliatory Eviction-A New Doctrine in
California, 46 CAL. S.B.J. 23 (1971), for extensions of this suggestion.
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would acquire remedies analogous to, if not equal with, those of the
landlord. This apparent equality, however, may in fact be deceptive.
Reciprocity of language does not reflect the practical situation that
the landlord is the owner of an income-producing, capital asset and
the tenant may or may not have the resources to continue to pay rent
for this asset. For example, the delay imposed by the Act upon the
exercise of the landlord's right to terminate for the tenant's breach re-
sults from the theoretical desirability that each party be afforded equiv-
alent time intervals to exercise the same rights. In practice this delay
would appear only to subject the landlord to a greater risk of losing
rental income without a corresponding social advantage to be gained
by allowing the tenant to remain in possession longer after his breach.
The extent to which practical inequities would be created by reciprocal
provisions of the Act needs further investigation.
David W. Van Home
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